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Article 5

Book Reviews
Soviet Semiotics: An Antho.[rgy edited, translated and with an introduction by
Daniel P. Lucid. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1977. Pp. viii

+

259. $16.00.

In the U. S. S. R., semiotics-the study of sign systems and signifying practices-is a lively discipline which has attracted outstanding scholars and given
rise to an important body of work. Soviet Semiotics is an anthology of
some of this work. It consists of 24 articles published between 1962 and
1974 and grouped into six sections: General Concepts, Modeling Systems,
Communication Studies, Text Analysis, Art and Literature, and Typology of
Culture. Some of the pieces are quite short-at least half a dozen do not run
over three or four pages-and most are by scholars who arc well known-if not
often read-in the United States: Juri Lotman, for example, has authored or
co-authored eight of the articles and Boris Uspenskij five. In an excellent
introduction, Daniel Peri Lucid describes and discusses the development of
semiotics in the U. S. S. R., from its early twentieth century roots in structural
linguistics and formalist literary theory through its birth in the 1950's as an
aid in tasks of machine translation to its coming of age as an autonomous
discipline in the 1960's, with particularly active centers in Moscow and Tartu.
Lucid also provides a good summary of the contents of the arrticles anthologized.
A good bibliography of Soviet studies in semiotics and of discussions of these
studies completes the volume.
Characteristic of Soviet semiotic writing is the belief that any aspect Df
human activity in the production, exchange and storing of information can be
considered a (sub),text-a culturally meaningful system of signs-and can be
studied as such: myth and religion (Zaliznjak, Ivanov and Toporov's "StructuralTypological Study of Semiotic Modeling Systems "), cartomancy (Lekomceva
and Uspenskij's "Describing a Semiotic System with a Simple Syntax," B. F.
Egorov's "The Simplest Semiotic Systems and the Typology of Plots"), chess
(I. 1. Revzin's "Language as a Sign System and the Game of Chess "), etiquette
(T. V. Civ'jan's "Etiquette as a Semiotic System"), history (Uspenskij's
"Historia sub specie semioticae "), personality (Piatigorskij and Uspenskij's
"The Classification of Personality as a Semiotic Problem "), art (Uspenskij's
"Semiotics of Art "), and so on and so forth. Texts can be grouped typologically, with the typologies originating in cultural universals and cultural
universals flowing from universals in human psychology (Lonnan's "Problems
in the Typology of Texts" and "Numerical Semantics and Cultural Types,"
Lotman and Uspenskij's "Myth-Name-Culture "). Texts are modeling systems: structures of elements and of rules for combining them which constitute
analogues to a given reality; natural language is taken to be the primary
modeling system and all other signifying structures are considered secondary
421
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modeling systems, built in terms of and upon natural language (Lorman's "Primary and Secondary Communications-Modeling Systems," Lorman and Piatigorskij's "Text and Function "). Culture is viewed as the most comprehensive system,
uniting the entire aggregate of signifying structures, and human beings are seen
not only as the modelers but also as the modeled, not only as creating signs
but also as created by them.
Unfortunately, equally characteristic of most of the articles making up
Soviet Semiotics is their fondness for generalities. Though the anthology
manages to suggest the tremendous implications semiotics and semiotic approaches
may have for such diverse disciplines as anthropology, psychology, history,
philosophy, sociology, literary analysis, or art criticism, though it addresses
crucial problems (the articulation of synchronic description and diachronic
description, for instance, or the segmentation of a text into primative elements)
and though it makes provocative claims (does natural language underlie all
non-linguistic systems of signs? are all such systems "unnatural"?), too many
of the pieces anthologized are basically programmatic (" What is to be done? "),
too many take hypothesis or argument for fact (p. 30: H the collective monologue of children ... has parallels in the surviving archaic features of linguistic
behavior in certain tribes"; p. 35: "the transformational rules ... in Chomsky'S
transformational grammar correspond to real features of discourse analysis and
synthesis as carried Out by people"; p. 41: "The sentences of language are
iconic signs ") and too many are (not so) ingenious translations of either
well-established or uninteresting facts (cartomancy and etiquette are semiotic
systems; there is an analogy between natural language and the game of chess;
Ionesco's plays investigate the nature of human communication). As such,
these pieces justify the attacks of those who are unimpressed by semiotics and
consider it to be a mere ecriture (as defined by the early Barthes) rather
than a (nascent) science.
This is regrettable because some of the articles collected by Lucid make
interesting points and make them well. Thus, Lotman's "Problems in the
Typology of Texts" distinguishes nine fundamental text types in terms of
social function and argues that real texts represent a complex fusion of these
types; Toporov's "The Semiotics of Prophecy in Suetonius" shows how omens
and prophecies govern the composition and content of Suetonius' work; and
Lotman and Uspenskij's "Myth-Name-Culture" suggests that poetry and myth
are antipodal and establishes interesting parallels between mythological and
scientific thought. Semiotics in general and Soviet semiotics in particular can,
after all, be most fascinating and valuable.
GERALD PRINCE

University of Pennsylvania
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The Gothic Visionary Perspective by Barbara Nolan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. Pp. xviii

+

268, 23 illustrations. $16.50.

The thesis of this book is that in the twelfth century a new "perspective"
or sensibility developed about visionary experiences. Artists began to create
works intended to involve the viewer or reader in an experience like that
of an "apocalyptic" or "anagogical" vision, one that saw the world in time
and redemptive history and so included the last things. Professor Nolan
begins "with descriptions of that perspective in its purest forms as it
appeared in commentaries and treatises" (p. xv)-she gives most attention to
commentaries on the Apocalypse by Rupert of Deutz, Joachim of Fiore, and
Richard of St. Victor-and proceeds to discuss the way it appeared in the
architectural idcas of Abbot Suger, the Gothic cathedral, and several illustrated manuscript Apocalypses. She doesn't <axgue that one manifestation
caused the Dther, but that there was a U context of attitudes toward history,
prophecy and vision developed by monastic and clerical writers of the
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries"; this context helps explain some
features of architecture and sculpture, manuscript paintings, and literature.
The literary works treated in detail are the Vita NUOWf, Pearl, and Piers
Plowman. In them we find an influence from memory systems, a use of linear
narrative that tells the events of world history leading to the apocalypse, and
a "double form in which a literal and allegorical sense are manifestly apparent
in the poetic process" (p. 136).
Visions in earlier times, it would seem, were just something in the Bible or
something that happened to some saintly figure, something to be recounted or
represented with diffidencc; in the twelfth century ,they became something
that might happen to anyone, that could be simulated, that a reader Of viewer
could participate in. Why and how this change took place is almost impossible to know. Prof. Nolan conjectures that it had a counterpart in the
Eucharist as redefined by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (material substance was an accidental "integument" for a spiritual presence); and, too,
that the role of the audience changed-" no longer detached from the narrator's
vision, they share with him the irony of an untenable situation ....They are
expected to see both the visionary world as it is seen by the stumbling narrator
and the same world in its universal or spiritual significance" (p. 141). The
causes of this change in "perspective" were probably more wide-ranging, and
I think she could have had more assistance from historians than she makes use
of: for example, Colin I\t1orris's study of the "emergence of the individual,"
R. W. Southern's concept of "scientific humanism," or the researches of
Giles Constable into twelfth-century spirituality. Individual experience comes
into the picture vividly in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries in any
number of ways-in the monasteries the imitation of the human Christ, in
aristocratic circles "courtly love," in the yisual arts a new mobility and
realism, in literature Ie psychological allegory." It's not surprising that redemptiye history and eschatology became personalized too.
It is probably unfair to judge this book by its thesis. The thesis is therc-

sblnething that can't always be said for scholarly b'ooks~but it keeps slipping
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through one's fingers. There is a sort of logical development in the chapters,
yet they are by the author's admission a series of selective essays, each of which
"is also intended to exist as an independent entity" {p. xvii)-they can, she
suggests, be read out of order. But it is hard to understand the order they are
in. After an effective chapter that explores Gothic cathedrals and illustrated
manuscript Apocalypses, we get a chapter on the Vita Nuova, perhaps the
best and most original literary analysis in the book This is followed by
a chapter, "The Later lVledieval Spiritual Quest," which treats some earlier
writings in French. The author doesn't seem to explain why Dante is taken out
of chronological sequence, and why Latin apocalyptic literature-Bernard of
Morval's De contemptu mundi, for example-is ignored.
And, too, the terminology is muddy. The visionary phenomenon being
described is referred to as an "experience" and a "mode "-but "mode," never
defined, is used in several senses, none tied to Northrop Frye's precise usc
of the term. (I for one wish "mode" were banished from the critical
vocabulary forever-it's in a class with "factor" and "parameter" and "in
terms of": a linguistic black hole used instead of a term that has a discernible meaning.) In the book's title this phenomenon is called a "perspective,"
probably a linguistic black hole too. "Visionary perspective" doesn't appear
until p. 44 and is not defined then or used much thereafter. The index, skimpy
on subject enrries, is of no help in pinning down such terms. "Gothic," by
the way, evidently means nothing more than "late medieval."
The shortcomings of the book are those of its genre: it appears to belong
to that increasingly prevalent genre, the Rewritten Dissertation. The exigencies
of academic promotion have required that such apprentice works. once published
(if at all) in discreet monograph series, go on parade as the work of seasoned
craftsmen. Their writers might be better advised to let the dissertation
languish and write something new: it's hard to remove from a dissertation
the telltale signs of haste, pressure, befuddlement, and conflicting advice. If
I am wrong about Prof. Nolan's book, it ,reveals a more alarming trend, that
academic books are beginning to imitate dissertations-not a promising development. Herbert Lindenberger has written about another rewritten dissertation
that the author" is more intent on engaging in dialogue with her mentors than
in addressing a larger scholarly audience ... .In speaking to one's mentors one
naturally shies away from generalities one fears would seem obvious to them."
This would explain why Nol-an fails to lay it on the line about her terms or
keep her argument in focus, and why her chapters are II independent entities.'1
(It would explain too some small gaucheries: one book1s place of publication
is given as "Maryland," for example, and a paper delivered at "the 1976
Medieval Institute" is mentioned-by 1976 there would have been a dozen such
Institutes.) One's mentors know everything about a dissertation because the
author has explained it all to them (or they to the author) at length in
their offices, usually before anything has been written; they get to be as close
to the work as the author, miss details, and lose touch with what a reader wants
to know.
I found this problem of communication most troublesome in that part of the
b~ok dealing with art. The a~thor isn't an art historian and is writing chiefly
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for literary scholars, but she speal{s of the art as if the reader is already one
step ahead of her. I found myself mostly hopping behind. "The Lamb and the
One Enthroned hold the book with seven seals," we read of Figure 16. I
see the One Enthroned. Ah, yes, I see the Lamb. But they arc holding what
look like sheets of paper, not a book, and there are no seals visible to the naked
eye. Obviously there is in the writer's mind someone in the Art History
Department with whom all this has been discussed. So on p. 66 we learn that
one manuscript illustration" recollects St. John's vision of the Lamb and the
seven-sealed book, to which Trier had devoted four full-page illustrations
(Figs. 12-15), into a single dynamic composition "~but it looks to my
untutored eye as if in Figure 15 the vision of the Lamb and the seven-sealed bOook
are depicted together, so I am the less impressed by the dynamic composition.
How will the untutored reader lose his innocence if writers don't foresee and
answer innocent questions? Yet graduate education in the humanities leaves
people more and more incapable of writing for the "general reader" -for
bright graduate students, colleagues in fields other than one's own, people who
want to learn.
I mention this because the boole is, ironically, put forward as a piece of
"reader response" criticism. Of course one can see how the sculptures of
a Gothic cathedral were meant to involve the viewer in a programmatic way.
A harbinger of this quality in art may well be religious writings like those
of Joachim of Fiore that are "wholly personal and radically historical," that
insist on "the centrality of a personal affective interaction between Revelation
and the reader" (p. 25). But reading is one hind of experience, walking into
a church or looking at a picture is another. Perhaps earlier Christian art sought
no less to promote an "affective interaction" but did so under the conditions
of a different sensibility; Nolan only wants to show what earlier art was not
and so doesn't face this possibility. The important point isn't that Gothic
art seeks involvement but bow it does so.
In all this talk about involvement one can't help feeling that the author
superimposed a "methodology" on a traditional piece of historical criticism.
It isn't hard to believe that exegetes writing about the Book of Revelation
"attended far more closely than had their forbears to St. John's cognitive
responses to his visions, even suggesting that the reader might share the
visionary's privileged experience" (p. 54f.) , and that a similar tendency is
discernible in manuscript painting. But who is the reader? how does he use
the book? Professor Nolan presumes a learned xeader who uses the pictures
like a memory system, who views the pioture first, then reads the accompanying
tcrt on the right and the gloss on the left, "step by step. and page by page."
Maybe so, but what evidence is there? Might not the pictures have been
viewed out of order? or shown to illiterate laymen and explained? or been
admired by clergy who knew the text well and didn't bother to read along?
We are told that "the illuminators ... sought to draw their readers closer to
vision" (p. 76), that" a Trinity colorist could create a. Christ with a face
of gold leaf gleaming from the page through which readers might be raised
to divine contemplation" (p. 77). It seems a failure of imagination that
these pit:;tures are taken to be "a reading experience," that artists are assumed
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to have been painting in gold leaf for "readers." And it is confusing to find
that "the reader" and "the audience" are the same (we read on p. 82 of
"the audience, turning the pages of the book"): if" reader response" critics
want to calculate an artist's expectations of response, they should be more
rigorous. An imagined reader is an alter ego, a solitary person turning pages,
but an audience is a social group; and there are readerships and "interpretative communities" besides.
The last half of the book treats the It visionary quest" in literature-in
Dante, in several French poets (Raoul de Houdenc, Huon de Meri, Rutebeuf,
Deguileville), and in Pearl and Piers Plowman. As a piece of literary criticism
it is all the right things-historical, interdisciplinary, "textual"; the chapters
are well organized, the writing clear and graceful. But the method is linear
explication de texte of a kind that could have been written twenty-five years
ago. It would have been better, or clearer, if each chapter were an essay on
the "Gothic visionary perspective" in each poem-but one has to hunt for
this. One finds it in a good deal of attention to the narrator (an intermediary
rather like St. John in the illustrated Apocalypses) and to the" double form"
(literal and allegorical), neither of which is a surprise. Nor does the "reader
response" criticism of the earlier chapters bear fruit here; it has withered on
the vine. The author sprinkles references to the reader and the audience"Will and the reader alike," "the dreamer and the audience," "Will (and
perhaps the audience) ," and so on. There are curious statements like "the
plowman is allowed to see what neither Will nor the pilgrims nor the audience
can" (if the audience can't see it, how do we know the Plowman does?).
But there is no effort to show how the language and the rhetoric of the poems
create a reader "in" the wor1{, or manipulate our responses, or presuppose an
imagined audience of a certain character.
Was that audience the same for all works that involved a "Gothic visionary
perspective"? Pearl with its number symbolism and intricacy, Piers Plowman
with its scholasticism and Latin quotes and grammatical metaphors were
obviously intendec1 for fit audience though few, but I suspect for quite
different kinds of audiences. The thesis of this book proposes the rise and
fall of a kind of visionary experience in art and literature, but doesn't bring
it to bear upon, or find it in, the two English poems discussed. The chapters
on Pearl and Piers Plowman are sensible readings, responsible, modest, making
no undue claim to originality, rather minimally attentive to other critical
interpretations. They don't bring the reader any closer to an understanding
of what is "Gothic" about them or what the "visionary perspective" was.
Piers Plowman is said to be the last example of the phenomenon, but the
audience capable of responding to this kind of art must have lingered on:
Piers Plowman had a continuing readership that included Spenser and Milton,
but Pearl dropped out of sight and was not read again until the nineteenth
century. Unless this was purely accidental, there must be a perspective in one
poem that isn't in the other, and there must have been readers that felt the
power of Langland's big shaggy work but viewed Pearl as a bejeweled popish
reliquary.
DONALD
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Medieval F1'ench Literature and Law by R. Howard Bloch. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1977. Pp. xii + 268. $14.50.

In The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (1927), Charles Homer Haskins
pointed out the connection between the resurgence of Roman law and various
literary structures in the high culture of the Middle Ages. The resurgence
occurs at a time when the anti-legal bent of the Cistercians and Spiritual
Franciscans held popular sway. Bolognese jurists adapt the techniques of
Biblical glossing and commentary to the Corpus Juris Civilis, and the epistolary
style of the dictamen serves for drafting documents and legal teaching.
CoevaIly, various librj de causis become sources for poetic composition.
Bernard Silvestris draws on the pseudo-Quintilian Declanurtiones Maiores,
and Peter of Riga comparably uses the Controversiae of the Elder Seneca.
For vernacular literature and courtly culture, the relation is more difficult
to trace. There is a social reality absent in academic verse, and the law
incorporated by literature is frequently customary and traditional. The
available compilations offer a retrospective view of practices rather than a
source for textual borrowing. R. Howard Bloch's Medieval French Literature
and Law examines these complex ties in the prose and verse forms of Old French
and Proven~al. Bloch's concern is to follow the parallel transformations of
social institutions and literary forms from the crisis of feudalism through the
emergence of a courtly ethos.
The opening chapters analyze the problematic relations of individual to
society and aristocracy to monarchy. Bloch finds in the thirteenth-century
La Mort Ie roi Artu a paradigm of the "crisis of values and institutions"
that had developed over a century .and a half. The collapse of Arthur's
kingdom would result not from fate or passions but directly from the failure
of its legal system. Immanent justice, based on accusation and the judicial
duel, proves vulnerable to subversion and bad faith: in the romance Arthur
oversteps his role as judge, and Lancelot willingly perjures himself. But
Bloch locates the defect " at the epistemological root" of the system: "Simply
stated, the outcome of combat exists independently of the notion of cognitive
truth." Customary procedures, unlike ius scriptum, are not concerned with
reconstructing events, weighing intention, or judging proof rationally. Their
inability to prevent recurrent violence assumes political dimensions in the feudal
epics where the disputes of barons evolve a cycle of vendetta prompted in
some measure by a sovereign'S injustice. The historical thesis is that technological advances which favor a strategy of defense in these disputes can be
related to a shift in literary themes from the pursuit of vengeance to the
impossible siege. Against critics who see the poems as embodiments of
aristocratic or monarchic ideals, Bloch argues that the feudal epic cycle
questions the very assumptions of a warrior society by emphasizing "the
general failure of war" and" the price of victory."
The inquest provides an alternative to the judicial duel and warfare. Its
recreating events in written form changes the legal system from accusation
to mediation based on abstract notions of truth. The growth of the inquest
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries entails different social relations and
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poetic models. No longer will force signal divine purpose, but "artistic"
probability and rhetorical flourish prevail. Similarly, colleotive action gives
way to individual confrontations with a state apparatus. In poetry, these
developments support "a tendency to individualize, to render abstract, and
to verbalize" struggles. The courtly lover becomes alienated from his lady,
from other courtiers and pocts, and finally from his emotions and himself.
Although one might complain that the literary theme is already treated in
classical elegy and satire, Bloch seeks to objectify its medieval existence by
concentrating on the definitions of self implied by the shifting institutions. He
would derive such features as the isolation of romance heroes or the oppositions
of the tel1so and joe partit from historical as well as literary impulses.
The informing principle of Bloch's analysis is that both literature and law
involve the displacement of action into verbal structures. By establishing this
common ground, he is able to reassess the social configurations of various
genres. The legal context explains the multiple tensions in the canso. There
the poet's appeal, though addressed to his lady, directs a claim against third
parties, whether they be lauzengers or merely rivals. The love plea approaches
disputation, and its dynamic revolves around the issues of judgment and
truth. Semantically, the terms joi and nzerei may connect the love lyric to
judicial forms of wagering and awards. In the prose romance, displacement
operates in the fiction that surrounds literary creation. The Pseudo-Map
cycle consciously derives its -origin in the transition from aventure to legal
records and then to a literary account. Documentation merges with mimesis,
and the chivalric novel serves as a kind of deposition. The aim of such
" translation" is "the fixing of the truth of the past so that it may be
remembered in the future." Yet the functions of memory and preservation
within a parchment bureaucracy suggest that other purposes have replaced the
conservative motives of traditional cultures.
The final chapter, on "The Ideology of C-ourtly Love," applies the
historical and literary insights to a problem that has occupied scholars since
Romanticism. Bloch portrays the courtly ethos as an ideal working against the
interests of the nobility who embrace it. Individualism and the interiorization
of values, which literature and law foster, aid the cause of monarchy by
limiting the baronial recourse to violence and class solidarity. The theological
insistence on intention and choice furthers "the designation of the individual
as an autonomous legal entity." In the lyric the value of 112ezura enforces these
limitations, but a crucial case appears in the Tristan myth. In the story of
Tristan and Iseult, Bloch finds the model "birth of subjective consciousness
and the foundation of the modern state." The episode in which Marc spares
the sleeping lovers emerges as an illustration of social consciousness founded
on notions of guilt and personal responsibility. Its meaning lies in the
implied social contract between sovereign and citizen rather than the class
identity of feudalism. It is on this contrast that subsequent literature relies.
Bloch's study offers specialists and general readers a wider view of medieval
French literature. The careful accounts of evolving legal institutions bring an
important perspective to critical interpretation. Yet the value of the book
goes beyond commentaries on the specific texts. Bloch has rightly decided to
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treat law as an inclusive rather than a limiting term. The principles of
medieval law, like those of its Roman predecessor, are both a model and a
reflection of s?cial reality. The study is rooted in this dialectical approach to
cultural and literary developments. It thus contributes a sophisticated theory
of relations to the pmctice of historical criticism.
ROBERT EDWARDS

State University of New York at Buffalo

H 071ze at Grasnzere by William Wordsworth, edited by Beth Darlington. Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. xiv

+

464. $25.00.

H omc at Grasmere is Wordsworth's long blank verse hymn of thanksgiving
upon his retirement to the Lake District in 1799 after years of homeless
wandering in the "wide waste" of the world. He began the poem in the
early spring of 1800 as "Part First, Book First" of his unwritten masterpiece,
Tbe Recluse, but beyond that ascertainable fact lie only mists of conjecture.
The poem exists in several manuscript stages of completion, and each manuscript
contains sections whose dating cannot be accurately fixed. As usual, Wordsworth
left us too much and too little. Some portions of the poem are constantly
present; others appear from nowhere in a fragmentary draft, and whether
they are copies of an earlier lost manuscript or newly indited, none can say for
sure. There are clues in dating-watermarks in the paper, references in letters.
stylistic mannerisms-but all told the poem presents a set of hazards that
would test any editor's judgment.
The dating of Home at GraS1Jzere is of particular importance because the
poem claims ra. present joy and a present sense of purpose. We know Wordsworth never entirely lost his love of Grasmere or his desire to "preserve/Some
portion of its human history," but we also know that he did lose joy as time
went on, and that his sense of duty narrowed into some unlovely forms.
Precise dating can suggest more accurately the shape of Wordsworth's emotional
life in some of his most creative years. It can indicate the continuity of his
visionary stance, and the breaks in continuity when events caused him to
revise or contradict his earlier beliefs. It may infonn us that he was capable
of writing joyful passages while in the midst of personal grief-a discovery
that might change some of our ideas about the supposed egotism of his
imagination.
Beth Darlington has benefited from the work of previous scholars of this
i fascinating poem.
Helen Darbishire reconstructed the "late n version of
I the poem, called MS. D, and published it as Appendix A in Volume 5 of the
Oxford edition. John Finch and James Butler produced useful studies of the
text. Darlington deserves ultimate credit, however, for the painstaking production of this edition, complete, as are other volumes of The Cornell Wordsworth, with photocopies of the chief manuscript pages and transcriptions from
them en face. Most imponant, we now have the earliest full text of the poem

J
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(MS. B), evidently completed in 1806, running alongside the familiar MS. D.
As with the 1805 Prelude, we now can evaluate the described experiences in
their primary form. Darlington has made available in their proper context
some early and deleted passages that will be debated over as long as there
is Wordsworth criticism.
In my book, Ruins and Empire, I have called attention to one of these,
Wordsworth's claim

Won

That in my day of childhood I was less
The mind of Nature, less, take all in all,
Whatever may be lost, than I am now. (B. 94-96)

itse:
mode

'cleve!

Nc

Written sometime (probably 1800-1801) between the backward-looking "spots
of time" which became The Prelude, 1798-1799, and the nostalgia of the first
stanzas of the Intimations Ode, this affirmation of Adamic joy seems a
precarious and poignant moment in the history of Wordsworth's self-analysis.
Like other passages in Home at Grasmere it articulates a satisfaction with
adult experience that wavered and finally vanished as family, friends, and
landscape lost their radiant appeal to his mind's eyes. Wordsworth would never
again make claims like these from the newly-published manuscript:

Som!

Frag
cross

scrul
appa
scho

In this majestic, self-sufficing world,
This all in all of Nature, it ,vill suit,
We said, no other [
] on earth so well,
Simplicity of purpose, love intense,
Ambition not aspiring to the prize
Of outward things, but for the prize withinHighest ambition. In the daily walks
Of business 'twill be harmony and grace
For the perpetual pleasure of the sense,
And for the Soul-I do not say too much,
Though much be said-an imag'e for the soul,
A habit of Eternity and God. (B. 204-215)
This is clearly the period of "\Vordsworth's maximum optimism, sustained only
a few years, ,vhich gave birth to the famous Prospectus, "On Man, on
Nature, and on Human Life."
Darlington confidently dates this latter
discursive passage during the Grasmere years, rather than 1798-99, as some
previous commentators have suggested.
Home at Grasmere emerges as one of the sunniest of English poems, a pure
expression of Hope in which the traditional heaven-haven of religious verse
has been naturalized to a terrestrial location in England's green and pleasant
land. We see the piety in the domestic dramas of the early draft, which
the poct later transferred to The Excursion. We see the devotional fervor of
W-Ordsworth's description of the birds whirling gracefully over Grasmere
lake, a passage acutely analyzed by Karl Kroeber in Romantic Landscape
Vision. And finally, this edition allows us to see Wordsvvorth breaking through
the limits of his naturalized imagination as he (against his own will, one feels)
converts the beloved scene before him into a religious emblem:
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A symbol of Eternity & heaven
Nor have we been deceived: thus far the effect
Falls not below the loftiest of our hopes
Tis not in holy Nature to betray
Or disappoint her genuine Votary
My trembling Heart acknowledges her Power
To be divine; & therefore infinite. (p. 355)
Wordsworth never included this fragment in any full draft of the poem, but
its existence informs us of one spiritual mode, or rather one terminological
mode, that he needed to excise. That, in turn, is another clue to his poetic
'development.
Not all the transcriptions of cancelled passages are so interesting, of course.
Some are entirely useless:
What [?] [? life]
[?] [? as ? above ?]

[?] (p. 237)

Fragments like this arc given a full page, as if they were pieces of the true
cross. Art is our religion, and no better proof can be offered than the
scrupulous exactitude of editions like this one. Fortunately none of the
appani interfere with the reading text, printed separately, and Wordsworth
scholars cannot help but be grateful even for scraps.
The serviceable quality of Darlington's edition-I particularly appreciate
the notes on all transcribed pages which key passages into the reading textshould enhance the reputation of Home at Grasmere. Early critics took the
poem at Wordsworth's own apparent valuation-they left it virtually untouched,
with the exception of \Villiam Minto, whose appraisal of 1889 has been reprinted in Wordsworth's Mind and Art, ed. A. W. Thomson (1969). "The
verse is of the poet's prime," he noted, "a fragment of that impassioned
history" which Wordsworth undertook to narrate in The Prelude. Critics of
the latter poem now have no reason to neglect this companion work, coeval
in composition, comparable (at its best) in poetic beauty and psychological
interest, a new star in the constellation of Wordsworth's major writings.
LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN

The University of Michigan

The Victorian Critic and the Idea of History: Carlyle, Arnold, Pater by Peter
Allan Dale.

Cambridge, Mass. and London:

Harvard University Press,

1977. Pp. 295. $13.50.
Sophisticated critical and scholarly investigation of Victorian literature probably can be dated from the appearance of Jerome H. Buddey's The Victorian
Temper in 1951. Challenging the connotations of "Victorianism," nearly all
disparaging, the book helped clear the way for an objective and less apologetic
view of the literature of the period. Now, after more than a quarter-century
of immense scholarly activity, we know in a general sense what the Victorians
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thought; \\'C are aware of their shared ideas. What still remains to be
determined is the manner of Victorian thinking, the process by which common
ideas were conceived. In an important essay_" The Formal Nature of
Victorian Thinking," PMLA, 90 (1975), 904-18-Gerald L. Bruns has argued
that the distinctive feature of the Victorian mind is the way in which history
is made to function as a formal property of thought. Examining Carlyle,
Arnold, and Ruskin, Bruns shows that for the Victorian prose writers the
meaning of an idea is inseparable from its history.
Although apparently unaware of Bruns's essay and of other recent literature
on the subject (about which I shall say more later), Peter Allan Dale in The
Victorian Critic and the Idea of History touches on many of Bruns's ideas to
demonstrate how historicism affected Victorian theories about the nature of
art. Investigating works by Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater, Dale is concerned
with II the philosophical manifestation of the historical sense" especially as it
is reflected in the three authors' thoughts on aesthetics.
The Introduction delineates the dimension of historicism in the nineteenth
century. It shows how, replacing physics and metaphysics, the historical
process was set up as the most likely venue to an explanation of experience,
although ultimately a thorough-going historicism, with its insistence that
history is the end of knowledge beyond which the human mind cannot ge,
was rejected by nearly all nineteenth-century thinkers.
Each author is treated in a section comprised of two chapters. The fust
chapter examines the sources of and influences on the author's thinking about
history-the fonnation of his philosophy, in other words-and the second
demonstrates how the writer's historical views inform his critical position.
Each critic is examined with reference to three concerns: the genetic approach
to criticism-that is, the relation between art and historical or cultural
forces; the role of art in society, specifically how it affects systems of
belief; and the concept of aesthetic value, especially the effort to find firm
grounds for evaluation of art. In the last analysis Dale is interested in discovering how each of the three critics reconciled himself intellectually and
emotionally to the implications of a historicity showing continuously changing
belicfs and values through time.
From the Gcrman Idealists Carlyle learned that "clothes," or systems of
belief in time, arc emanations of the Divine l\1ind outside of time. Henee
if a my thus fails, a ncw my thus will arise, phoenixlike from the ashes of
the old, so that man can be dclivered spiritually. The function of the
poet is to penetrate the veil thrown up by the Time-Spirit to discover
things as they really arc, the Divine Idea. For Carlyle the test of a work
of art is its ability to induce in the readcr belief in the Idea that the work
expresses. But, as Carlylc was aware, the dcgree of penetration is limitcd by
historical conditions. and to O,'crcome this difficulty in his aesthetic thcory
he {lined with the notion that the poet's special talent lies in his figurative or
symbolic expression. Yet in the cnd. becausc of a lack of critical sensitivity and
becausc of his preoccupation with o"crcoming the world of the Not-Self.
Carlyle restcd his aesthetic theory on the truth-telling role of art.
hiatthew Arnold learned from his fathcr and untimately from Vico the
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concept of the cyclical periodim.tion of history.
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Unlike Carlyle he was

disconcerted by the spectacle of the endless passing of systems of belief; he
could not give credence to the idea that the process emanates from the
Divine. For him the developing Zeitgeist is a purely secular process. Yet,
retaining a basically religious longing for a stillpoint amidst the whirling flux
of history, Arnold fixed upon the concept of the harmoniously developed
Best Self, a concept taken £rom the Stoics and Spinoz-a. which is independent
of the process of changing ideas. Hence religious belief is to be valued in
so far as it supports the psychological and moral organization of the mind,
the belief itself being emotionally a sort of feeling and intellectually an
illusion which refers to no reality outside itself. Reflected in his poetics, this
view causes Arnold to stress not the truth-telling role of art, as in Carlyle,
but its ability to evoke moral and emotional attitudes in the reader. How
does art do this? By form, 'aIchitectonics, the grand style. Locating value
in the supposed permanent emotional and moral needs of the personality,
Arnold in effect denies the historical element in the work of art. He does
not consider how the capacity to experience the inner peace of Dante's U In
la sua volontade e nostra pace" can exist without faith in the medieval
Christianity which inspired it.
Tracing Pater's intellectual development, Dale locates the later Victorian
critic within the empiricist tradition. He is particularly illuminating in his
discussion of Pater's debt to John Stuart IVlill, although in my opinion he does
not give sufficient prominence to the elements of Oxford idealism in the
critic's thought. As an empiricist of Epicurean tendency, Pater made no
attempt to transcend history: he accepted the historical process and looked for
no spiritual reality behind it. Hence he relied on sensuous and emotional
experience as the only experience of which we can be certain. Yet at the
same time, in an effort to get beyond this, he embraced the concept of the
continously developing culture of the race :as a value in itself. Ultimately he
was little at ease with the complete historicist position. As a critic he
focussed on the direct sensuous and emotional experience conveyed by art.
He believed that from the perspective of his own Weltanschauung the artist
experiences the sensible world, whose impression he assimilates and imitates so
fully that his art becomes pure perception. The value of an art object thus
resides in an inarticulate sensuous and formal condition, a complete unity of
idea and expression.
Following the section on Pater a short Conclusion, in which the author
sums up his treatment of the three critics and suggests their importance, closes
the book.
The summary I have provided in no way does justice to Dale's book and
the complexity of trootment of the three Victorian critics. Although the
book is arranged in three chief sections devoted to one figure each, it would
be a mistake to read only the section on Arnold, say, to :iiee what the author
has to say about this particular critic. It would be a mistake because the book
must be read in its entirety. For it is not only a study of Carlyle, Arnold,
and Pater; it is also an investigation of the historicist oudook in Victorian
England and, further, an effort to trace how Victorian critics attempted to
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make of poetry a variety of religious experience. No other work with which
I am familiar does this so well. I commend it highly to all who are interested
in Victorian intellectual history and in Victorian aesthetic theory.
I could wish, however, that Dale had addressed himself to the implications
of Bruns's article mentioned earlier, because I believe that the book would
have been even better had Dale attempted to go just one step further and show
how history functions in the case of Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater as a fo-rmal
property of thought. He comes close to doing this but never quite gets to it.
It may be unfair to charge him with neglect of Bruns's essay because it may
be that his study was submitted to the Harvard Press in 1975 and that it took
the Press two years to produce the book. Yet I wonder about this. For
when I look at the notes I find allusion to no work published later than 1972,
Dale is presumably unfamiliar with, for example, Abbott Ikeler's Puritan
Temper and Transcendental Faitb: Carlyle's Literary Vision (1972), David
DeLaura's essay "Matthew Arnold and the Nightmare of History" CStratfordupon-Avon Studies XV [1974]), or Har<lld Bloom's introduction to the
Selected Writings of lValte1' Pater (1974)-a11 of which are pertinent to his
concerns and the ideas of which one would have liked for him to engage.
Could it be that Dale completed an earlier form of this study by 1972 and in
reworking it did not keep up with ,the scholarship published during his
revision?
I could also wish that the book did not frequently suggest an underlying
polemical purpose. Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater seem to be judged as thinkers
and critics by the degree to which they approached complete historicism.
Hence Carlyle is said to have "failed to satisfy the vanguard minds of the
succeeding generation" who were "to seek their interpretations of life in
the realms of philosophical and scientific thought rather than in intuition and
fideismj to look to human nature and human society as the ultimate grounds
for belief rather than to an otherworldly Absolute" Cpp. 86-87). Hence it
is hinted that Arnold's work is limited because "Anlold, like Carlyle before
him, ... obviously continues to believe in the possibility of achieving a new
formula of belief that will deliver society from the abyss of relativism" Cp.
168). Hence Pater is applauded because "like l\1allarme Pater is working
against all metaphysical and intelleotuallist approaches to the spiritual principle
in ar,t" (p. 219). In his summation Dale says:
the critics I have been discussing [turned1 to poetry ... more and
more ... as a substitute for the concept of belief itself. Whatever the
value of this enterprise as a criticism of Efe, its value for criticism
was extremely important. By undermining the concept of belief itself
the historicist outlook at the same time undermined the ancient assumption that poetry is a variety of truth or knowledge, closer to
philosophy than to history. In this its tendency was ever to compel
critical attention back upon more specifically aesthetic criteria for
the discussion of art and to liberate art from subservience to criteria
more suitably applied elsewhere. Cp. 255)
Thus Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater appear to be important as critics because
they prepared the way for t\ventieth-century fonnalism; they seem to be
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important as historical thinkers because they anticipate the complete historicism
of Collingwood, Croce, Dilthey, Meinecke, and Ortega. One comes away
from the book with the impression that Dale finds his three Victorian subjects
interesting and valuable just to the degree they depart from the transcendental
thinking of the Romantics and point towards the positivism of the present
century.
Whatever reservations I have about the book are, however, comparatively
minor, and in stating them I do not mean to give the impression that I do not
v.alue Dale's work highly. Tbe Victorian Critic and the Idea of History is an
important boole. In my estimation it is one of the most valuable studies of
Victorian literature published in recCnt years. During a period like the
1970's when the historical dimension of literature is increasingly regarded as
a significant area of study Peter Allan Dale's book, with its learning and its
clarity of expression, is especially welcome, because it can serve as a model
for the kind of literary-historical scholarship that one would lil{e to see produced.
CLYDE DE

L.

RYALS

Duke University

Cbnrles Clmrcbill by Raymond J. Smith. New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1977.
Twayne Series. Pp. 156. $8';0.
Graduate studcnts, as they prepare nervously for examinations, often give
one another sample questions. The questions I remember had either a trick
(" what is the great epic poem of the Restoration?"), or a joke (" who is the
oldest dog in literature" ?), or else probed the gaps in which only minor
authors are found (" name the most important English satirist between Pope and
Byron "). This was the context in which one learned about Charles Churchill,
and for most, he remained only a name, mattering little more than Hector the
Toothless Hound, the name of Natty Bumppo's dog.
Those who bothered to read Churchill, however, would be pleasantly surprised. Here was a writer of immense vigor and considerable skill, who poured
out words in torrents and lashed victims by the score: an entertaining man at
the very least, good value for time spent, especially among the poets of the later
eighteenth century. The careful reader would find every requisite of the
satirist's art: a sophisticated satiric persona, biting enemy portraits, clever
fictions, skillful verse, effective \vords and figures, interesting shifts of tone
and point of view, moral earnestness and a sensc of humor. His performances,
furthermore, seem better to fulfill the canons of his own time than the
performances of Pope. If the satirist shall tell the truth, he is much more
literal than Pope; if the satirist shall be a good man with no secret eD\·ics,
he is more forthright than Pope; and if the srrtiris( shall be heartily angry at
yice, Churchill is so handsomely direct as to nuke Pope seem dcdous by
comparison. Yyor 'Vinters could declare that Churchill's bst poem, the
"Dedication" to "\Varburton, was better than anything in Pope and Dryden
oombined.
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Yet Churchill remains neglected, perhaps because his excellences fade when
when we put down his book. They are genuine, but they are diluted. His
satiric persona runs dangerously close to self-indulgence; his portraits bite,
but they lose force when they chew some detail to a pulp afld leave the essence
untouched; a clever fiction, if pressed too hard, will cease to seem clever.
Churchill flows so copiously that skillful lines and effective words get swamped
among the ordinary; and his shifts of tone sometimes seen random. The
eighteenth-century canons of satire, despite their popularity, are crude: a
satirist, like other poets, needs a shaping imagination first, "truth," candor, and
anger second; Churchill is more forthright than he is inventive. Despite the
praise of Winters and a fine edition by Douglas Grant, studies of Churchill
have been few: a book, a handful of articles, and now, this second book,
written for Twayne.
Being a book about a neglected figure, it is obliged to make him as interesting
and attractive as it can. Being a book for Twayne, it is required to summarize
each work in chronological order. The second concern cannot help the
first. Churchill's virtues do not shine forth in methodical summaries of his
themes and occasions, and his significance does not -appear in brief, judicious
estimates of each poem's success or failure. The reader who does not know
Churchill's work already will get some sense of it this way, but not a lively
one, nor can a book of this kind make him eager to read it. But tIllS is to
cdticize the format more than Professor Smith: his information is accurate,
his judgments are unpretentious; his prose is lucid. The reader who needs
the political and personal background of the poems will find it here, and in
those spaces where the format allows it, the literary historian can find some
interesting and helpful things to think about.
Professor Smith's analysis giv·es us a satirist who makes the conventional
points one expects in Augustan satire, uses its devices with ease, alludes to
its entire range, abides by its canons. Churchill -asserts ".reason," just as he is
supposed to do, but as Smith points out, he actually defines what he means by
it, and this turns out to be his own, individual Teasoning, not some established
order to be taken for granted. The result is nearly to reverse what one finds
in Dryden and Pope: Churchill asserts the individual, not society; idiosyncracy,
not constraint. His creed is !rational freedom, but not in the style of Dryden's
cousin at Chesterton or of Pope in his grotto; he celebrates the genteel excess
and insouciant freedom of John Wilkes. He can stay within the canons of
Augustan satire and resemble in tone and demeanor that most" un-Augustan"
of writers, Laurence Sterne. All of this is caus~ for thought: do H preRomantic" experiments come about because an author adheres more closely
than before to the &tandards that Augustans profess?
Smith alludes to another matter more interesting still: Churchill, in certain
places, has a trick of dissolving words. He employs them in ironic contexts
and at the same time exploits in them a kind of "doubleness" (p. 32) which
makes us unable to be sure that they have their meanings any longer. They
may mean one thing, or they may mean its opposite: what force they have
depends entirely on the author's mind, and the author, being ironic, speaks
indirecdy. At its best, in the Wa:rburton poem, tIlls technique puts us
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directly in contact with the moral circumstances that concern the poet: our
effort to understand him makes us judge them as if for ourselves. At other
moments, Churchill's prolixity dilutes the ,effect. But here is where Churchill
is genuinely post-Augustan. Dryden and Pope could assume that words have
meanings-fixed, objective significances to which their users ought to be respon-

sible. Pope did not expect such responsibility in the world outside his grotto,
but he did expect it of his readers, for they share the grotto with him.
Churchill not only does not expect it-at these moments, at least-but does
not value it; he enjoys the problem of subject and object, for his rational
freedom to make the world what he will is his summum bonum: tyranny is
what frightens him, not chaos.
Professor Smith cannot dwell on such topics for long, for he is soon required
to sum up and get on with the next poem. Format summons, and he must obey.
But the book has value. It does not persuade one to read Churchill for the
first time, which is a pity, but it steadily helps those who are doing so, and
intermittently, it speaks to those who have done so already.
ALAN FISHER

University of Washington

The Chronicle of Leopold and Molly Bloom: Ulysses as Narrative by John
Henry Raleigh. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1977. Pp. xi + 293. $12.50.
Joyce's Ulysses and the Assault upon Character by James H. Maddox, Jr. New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1978. Pp. xi + 244.
$14.00.
Joyce's Moraculous Sindbook by Suzette A. Henke. Columbus, Ohio: University
Press, 1978. Pp. xi + 267. $15.00.
The title of John Henry Raleigh's book, The Chronicle of Leopold and Molly
Bloom, describes what it is; the subtitle, Ulysses as Narrative, what it is notunless Raleigh means by narrative that the years between 1865, the beginning
of the Chronicle proper, and 1904, the year in which the action of Ulysses
is set, follow each other in prediotable sequence. As a chronicle, Mr. Raleigh's
book tells us most everything we might want to Imow about the Blooms and
a good deal about which many readers of Ulysses ought to care less. We learn
of the Blooms' ancestry and family history, of their respective childhoods, of
their courtship, their friends, their attitudes and opinions about nearly everything (much of the Chronicle consists of reproduction chunks of the text
of Ulysses rearranged chronologically when possible and topically when
chronology is irrelevant). Although much of the material Raleigh records,
including the usual run of Dublin arcana, details of timing and placement,
inconsistencies in the narrative, volitional and non-volitional errors by Joyce

,
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and/or his characters, is collected in other reference books and in numerous
articles on Ulysses scattered hither and yon, Raleigh's useful innovation is
chronology. He literally lets the naturalism Df Ulysses follow its course,

Therefore the Chronicle begins in the year 1865, the year Rudolph Virag
arrives in Dublin and subsequently conceives his son, Leopold Bloom (Virag
changed his name in 1866). And the Chronicle ends with DNa appendices, one
a list of Bloom's addresses beginning in 1866, and another a chronological list
of Bloom's jobs beginning in 1881 and continuing to the book's present.
Raleigh claims he began WO!fk on the Chronicle as a hobby during the years
he was an administrator at the University of California, Berkeley. A hobby
is usually obsessive and a hobbyist usually gets his facts right. Raleigh scores
on both counts. The book is filled with the minutiae, quiddities, and accidents
of over forty years .of a fictional couple's history (I emphasize fictional because
somewhere along the line Raleigh has lost the distinction between literary
characters and real people). Insofar as accuracy goes, the Chronicle is
relatively error free. There are a couple of lapses on p. 72 and p. 77 where we
are told after separate entries first to see pp. 00 above and then p. 00 below,
a nifty trick in either case. But for the most part Raleigh is accurate. He
is also, by turns, fascinating and maddening. After a helpful excursis, for
example, into the Hungarian byways (paternal side) of Bloom's family history,
including a report on the theory of naming in eighteenth-century Hungary
and a speculation on Joyce's habits of transliterating names, Raleigh records
the name Karoly as that of Bloom's maternal grandfather. Claiming to "know
Joyce," Raleigh guesses "that KalToly was not the original name which the
father of Higgins changed to Karoly." Since the name Karoly is mentioned
only once in Ulysses, there is no fictional context for worrying over this matter.
Here and elsewhere Raleigh goes too Lur-he assumes that a narrative record
has a naturalistic life of its own even when the interpretive reward for such
speculation is nil. Raleigh's obsession with the pre-life and "after-life" of
literaTY characters is of a different order than, say, Hugh Kenner's recent
speculation about unnarrated events during the day of Ulysses, events that we
can assume have taken place and that directly affect narrative context. Much
of Raleigh's speculation affects nothing. Later in the Chronicle we learn that
the month of Bloom's proposal to Molly is not mentioned in Ulysses. But
Raleigh very much wants it to be May. Naturally, he tabulates the number
of times each month is mentioned in the text and concludes that May wins the
day (or the month, as the case" may" be). The fact that two occurences of
May in the text refer not to the month but to Mary (May) Dedalus does not
daunt Raleigh in the least. Rather, it's his "last point" in an argument that
has lost touch with logic and skirts perilously close to parody. May, it seems,
was the familiar name of Joyce's mother, thus proving that Bloom proposed to
Molly in May.
Raleigh will obsess over these things-that is the way he reads Ulysses. But
I am less bothered by Raleigh's perception of "real " or recordable detail (present
or absent in the text) than with his svrange conception of his book as an
introduction to Ulysses as Narrative (subtitle). Along with some statements
in the introduction to the Chronicle, the subtitle misleads the unsuspecting
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reader about the contents, format, and utility of Mr. Raleigh's book. Even
though Joyce, as Raleigh points out, was interested in naturalism and lectured
on the naturalism of Defoe's work, the recovery of naturalistic sequence does
not justify billing Raleigh's book as a guide to narrative issues in Ulysses. In
his prefatory statements, Raleigh protests too much. The first among multiple
purposes for the Chronicle suggests that the book is "to serve as an introduction to Joyce for the uninitiated who are, understandably, intimidated by
the bulk and complexity of Ulysses in tota." Later, Raleigh advises that" the
Chronicle is no substitute for the novel, merely an introduction," as if anyone
would misperceive it as a substitute. The mere idea suggests priorities have
gone awry. Like other reference or guide books, the Chronicle can provide
information for both the uninitiated and the initiated, it can put matters of
narrative event into chronological sequence, it can clear up beclouded fictional
history. But finally, it is an adjunct to Ulysses not an introduction to it. Those
who have some experience with Ulysses are not likely to be taken in by
Raleigh's half-hearted attempt to foist his book off as something it is not.
Those who come to Ulysses thinking Raleigh's book will tell them something
about narrative are in for a surprise.

If Mr. Raleigh's subtitle is misleading, James Maddox's title, Joyce's Ulysses
and the Assault upon Character, is simply less elegant than his book. Just who
is assaulting whom? I think Maddox means assault in several senses: assault
as an attempt, a means of "getting at" character; but also, especially in the
radically stylized chapters of Ulysses, an attack on the notion of centrality in
representing character in the novel. But" assault" is the wrong word for
Joyce whose aesthetic sympathies, like his politics, were pacific by design. If,
however, Maddox means the assault in his title to refer to his own rather than
joyce's treatment of character, then I think he misperceives his own critical
finesse. Maddox is not an assault artist-he is less the Rocky Marciano of
Joyce criticism than its Sugar Ray Robinson.
Maddox's choice for a title bears upon an assumption controlling his book,
an assumption stated explicitly carlyon. l'vladdox belongs to the school of
Joyce whose spiritual leader is S. L. Goldberg, to whom Maddox alludes in
the space of a few pages as overwhelming, definitive, brilliant, elegant, and
aesthetically hoarding (Goldberg keeps "the baby with the bath water").
Like Goldberg, Maddox is bothered by the "encyclopedic" Ulysses whose
various and distorted styles detract from the sine curve of character. He
writes emphatically though, to his credit, less often than Goldberg of "the
severe limitations of these styles which have lost touch with their subject
matter" (p. 186). Oddly enough, Maddox even likes some of the chapters he
feels compelled to question; nevertheless the assumption that Ulysses risks
losing touch with its subjeots (literally, its people) governs the argument and
organization of the book. Maddox discusses Ulysses by re-arranging its
chapters on the basis of a kind of character quotient. Those chapters with
most "character," so to speak, get discussed first. It is not in the least
surprising that Maddox is better, much better, on those sections of Ulysses
stylistically closer to the consciousness of its charaoters. His treatment of

•
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Stephen in Proteus, for example, is extraordinarily supple, one of the best
readings of that chapter available; and his reading of the early Bloom chapters
is first-rate, Maddox is also excellent on a latcr chapter like N {(usicaa, a bit of
a breather as prelude to the complicated night chapters to follow. Generally,
l\1addox is weak and tired in his treatment of the larger, encyclopedic, and
parodic chapters of Ulysses. He is a good enough critic to provide some
trenchant observations about Aeolus, W Cmde1"ing Rocks, Sirens, Cyclops, Oxen
of the Sun, Circe, and Ithaca, but for the most part he fights old battles, rehashes old material, and seems anxious to get on with what he does well, to
return to the consciousness (his consciousness and theirs) of character. Maddox
sees character (and what it constitutes) as the primary form of Ulysses.
Characters are "souls" with marking and idiosyncratic rhythms. Joyce's
fiotion records sets of relationships among a soul and its rhythms. its surrounding physical world, its record or memory, its incremental patternings
(authorial allusions, archetypes, and correspondences). What makes the matter
of character fictionally generative for Maddox is the paradoxical notion that
while the "soul" is essentially ineffable, indefinable, irreducible, numinous,
mysterious, and in spiritual motion, the fictional stuff of Joyce's world is
anything but ineffable-it is materially and historically reproduced; it is physically and artistically textured. So the guiding technique of joyce's representing
method presents a character (s-oul) knowable by repe-ated sets of relations
with things around or surrounding it, from controlled epiphanies to focused
correspondences (parallax) to kinds of interchangeability (metempsychoses).
Maddox explains: "Joyce's art is the art of the unspoken, an art of surround
and periphery, implying and evoking but never naming the center" (p. 12).
"Whether we are spe-aking of the epiphany, of characterization, of the
manipulation of style, or of the use of correspondences, the primary configuration within UlysseS is the same: a collocation of details which point
toward an unnamable center" (p. 15).
Maddox's ideas about character may focus on ineffable centers, but they do
not produce ineffable results. As a critic, he is precise, clear, intelligent,
resourceful, and generative. Although he is !DO generous and too thorough
in presenting, repeating, and reformulating the strategies of others (Noon's
Aquinian speculations, Goldberg's Joycean aesthetics, EHmann's triangulations),
the patient read~I will endure just to see Maddox rekindle sparks of interest
from the dying embers of rthe obvious. The book is filled with throwaways
as productive as the winner of the Gold Cup race. Stephen, as Maddox points
out with economical precision, acts as if he has -a need to be watched. Maddox
gets him right. Bloom operates by a kind of internal gyroscope. Maddox
sees Bloom's essential rhythm as «self-dispersal and reassimilation." Simon
Dedalus is wonderfully described as a "synedoche for his city." Maddox
suggests that the declension of Bloom's name in Circe is something of an epic
descent (or decline). In Cyclops, Bloom's lot is given paradoxical formulation:
"the unbenefitting apostle of compassion." Maddox cleverly marks Nausicaa
as a turning point in the novel, the difference, so to speak, between day and
night. On a few occasions, almost too few to mention, Maddox nods. I wish
he would not have referred to the jargony "solution of his [Bloom's]
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life-problem." Even more, I wish he had not said "But then wham" in
reference tQ one 'Of Molly's quick transitions. And I wish there were a

little less bowing and scraping at the feet of S. L. Goldberg. These are minor
matters. Maddox has written a good book.
Suzette Henke's title, Joyce's Moraculous Sindbook, is neither misleading nor
inappropriate; it's simply portmanteau. "Moraculous ... sindbook' is 'One of
joyce's many references to Ulysses in Finnegans Wake. Combining morality
and miracle, sin and sind (German" being" in forms 'Of the present indicative),
the configured title implies a movement from ethics to what Ms. Henke sees
as phenomenological transcendence. The central thesis in Ms. Henke's book
is that rthe three main characters in Ulysses, unable to deal fully or satisfactorily
with the pressures of the world in which they circulate, make something of
a phenomenon of themselves-they move out of the physical and culture-bound
world into the liberating world of the creative imagination: "In the course of
the novel, the three protagonists escape from 'sin' into a realization of
existential Dasein" (p. 10). I wonder if Bloom, reading the Sweets of Sin at
the bookstall, would see it this way?
All important creativity for Ms. Henke is post-creative, that is, Nietzschean:
"Joyce's A1oraculous Sindbook is an attempt to re-create Ulysses as an
existential act of mind and a phenomenological life-world" (p. 11). The
characters and, presumably, the readers and perceivers of the phenomenological
systems in Ulysses adjust to "a life-world beyond the scope of immediate
experience ,j (p. 6). For John Henry R<31eigh, the world of Ulysses is so real
it needs a chronicle; for Suzette Henke, the referential world is the
enemy and Joyce's characters in Ulysses are all artists waiting for their work
to happen in their heads: Joyce" delights in the capaciousness of the human
imagination and implies that every individual can become an 'artist of life'
through myth, sympathy, and creative fantasy" (p. 12). Stephen is a "selfdeclared artist .of the beautiful." Bloom is an "unselfconscious artist of
sympathy." Molly is perhaps "the most prolific artist in Ulysses." Art (art) is
democratic. Any question of craft is held in abeyance or rendered impotent
(potential put behind, I suppose, since most democratic art in the book is the
articulation of memory). Ms. Henke's attitude toward art as craft is something like Stephen'S attitude toward work: WDrk? Count me out.
joyce's characters ought to give up on their worlds because they can more
profitably negotiate their own interior spaces: "Joyce's characters move
from a world of psychological enclosure to an existential liberation of consciousness" (p. 12). Or, to report it another way: "The true protagonists of
Ulysses-Stephen, Bloom, and Molly-all exult in the playground of the mind"
(p. 8). One doesn't so much want to deny such a statement, one merely
wants to ask, only in the mind and nowhere else? If Bloom's walks around
Dublin are the "F£eudian perambulations of a masochistic id," and if Molly
is "the Logos that arises from sensuous experience and perpetually affirms
existence in a yea-saying moment of transcendent ekstasis," one is forced to
conclude that for Ms. Henke the important things in Ulysses a.re out of this
world.
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Ms. Henke has been at work on her book for seven years and seems to
have cast a nearly and deciding vote for Phenomenology. She claims allegiance
to Geneva (Phenomenology) and an -older New critical Haven. She ac1mowledges as one of her champions J. Hillis Miller, the late 1960's advance
man for Phenomenology in America. But Miller's Geneva lights have dimmed
only to flash again in a N c\ver deconstructionist Haven. Henke's plight is
something like that of .Max Beerbohm who took several years to master the ideas of
Henri Bergson only to complain that his" philosopher's" once rising star was now
descendant over the hnrizon. Henke's problem is that she hasn't moved fast
enough for Phenomenology in these, our modern moments. But she doesn't
need Phenomenology. Once she sheds her jargon and banishes her sources
to footnotes, she is actually a fine critic of the much more various states of
mind that joyce's characters display.
A paragraph by Henke on the choices, strains, and anxieties of Stephen
Dedalus looking into a mirror is worth a chapter of phenomenological jargon.
An observation that Mary Dedalus enters in upon the scene of Ulysses like a
pre-Raphaelite painting is better than a host of debatable remarks about the
liberation of consciousness. Noting that Gerty ,MacDowell is the perfect creature to be attracted to (and by) an ad man is both pertinent and witty.
Pointing out that Bloom's sense of feminine interchangeability is so strong that
for him to make love to anyone besides Molly would be a kind of incest is
kinkily apt. Ms. Henke can be a good critic; her difficulties come when she
absorbs herself with special phenomenological pleading. When she takes the
same hostile stance towards the material and physical matter of the book that
she assumes Joyce's charaoters take she is Cyclopean and unifocal. For example, she writes of the newspaper world of Aeolus: "The newspaper world
is a microcosm of paralysis and of mechanistic aggression." It is that, no
doubt, but the newspaper is also part of the stylistic "stuff" of Ulysses, an
urban daily organ in a novel partly dedicated to recreating one or another
daily organ from the day of its plot to the body of its schema. Ms. Henke
is only intermittently receptive to the variety of fictional programs in Ulysses.
The style of Moraculous Sindbook is, like its title, oracular, even gnomic.
Previous commentators on Ulysses, Ellmann and Kenner among them, share in
this tendency. Ms. Henke tells us that "Bloom is an artist of compassion;
,Molly, an artist of passion"; H Eros is transient, agape transcendent"; "Bloom
warrants our pity, but not our tears." I mention these observations not to
condemn them, but to record a stylistic feature prominent in Ms. Henke's
boole. Some readers may find these formulations helpful.
There are t¥lO mattei'S I would mention in conclusion. Ms. Henke, like
so many critics before her, assumes without reservation that Stephen urinates
on the beach in Proteus, although she admits that his effort (for this "relief"
much thanks) "undergoes such extraordinary celebration that the physical act
is barely recognizable." Perhaps it is barely recognizable because it does not
happen. In a recent essay, David Hayman argues that Stephen masturbates
rather than urinates, but I have yet to read an argument on this matter that
convinces me the passage in question refers to anything but Stephen contemplating
moving back across the tidal pool on the strand distinctly named Cock Lake
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before the advancing water cuts him off. The passage in Proteus is usually
cited as an instance of Stephen generating artistic material out of his own self,
so to speak; but physical reality here seems to take precedence over the
phenomenon of creativity. Another small, organic matter as so many matters,
small and otherwise, are in Ulysses: Ms. Henke refers to Cissey Caffrey's
remark about Bloom's II masterworks ... out of order," and concludes that
"Cissey's pun reflects the dysfunction of both timepiece and codpiece." Just
what does a phenomenologist think a codpiece is?
MICHAEL SEIDEL

Columbia University

The Victim as Criminal and Artist: Literature from the American Prison by
H. Bruce Franklin.
xxii
337. $13.95.

New York:

Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp.

+

Reading Franklin's book on American prison literature makes one recall
Lenin's comment that intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than
is unintelligent materialism. Here is materialism so unintelligent that vulgar
Marxism acquires new dimensions and reaches new depths one thought impossible, at least in a book published by an academic press. There are so many
things wrong with this book that only a lengthy essay could unravel all the
errors, but The Victim as Criminal and Artist is not important or substantial
enough to deserve that much attention. (For a detailed discussion of Franklin's
political and theoretical assumptions, I recommend a review by Paul Breines
in Telos, 15 [Spring, 1973], 138-145, of The Essential Stalin which Franklin
edited and introduced.)
Franklin's major thesis is that the real criminals have not been prison
inmates but plantation owners, middle class racists, and capitalists. Whereas
Eugene Debs believed that the existence of prisons was symptomatic of an
unjust society and that it was a socialist goal to create a world where prisons
would not be necessary, Franklin means something much simpler; in fact,
Franklin never suggests that prisons ought to abolished, which is of course
one of the dominant themes of revolutionary prison literature. According to
Franklin, although slavery was abolished after the Civil War, capitalism was
not, so that slavery merely changed its form. If in 1850 blacks were in
chains as Southern property, since then blacks have been enslaved by penal
institutions. Despite so much discussion of black culture, there is no analysis
whatsoever of l'acism; rather, racists, especially academics, are sneered at.
The one important distinction he makes in a book not terribly discriminating
is between the II collective revolutionary consciousness" of blacks, which
he traces from Douglass to the Panthers, and "the loneliness of the isolated
convict ego, branded and cast out, seeking either to reintegrate with the
social order or to defy it in anarchic rebellion" (p. 262). Although some
white prisoners also have what he calls revolutionary consciousness, for the
most part whites tend to be conformist or individualistic. Even this idea
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makes little sense if one examines the literature. For example, George
Jackson turned violently against his own upbringing, family and culture, and
turned toward a highly individualistic self-discipline, reading Marx, Lenin, and
Mao. Jackson created a revolutionary self .after bracketing out black American
culture; it was only after becoming a revolutionary that he began to identify
sympathetically with other blacks and those parts of himself he suppressed in
order to become a revolutionary.
Although the book approaches a kind of black nationalism, Franldin tries
to be even-handed, matching (like a Federal judge) every chapter on black
oolture with one on a white author. Following the first chapter on the slave
narrative is a. chapteT on Herman Melville entitled H The Worker as Criminal
and Artist." How worker Melville was able to achieve such infallible anticapitalist lucidity while other white workers and prisoners were unable to do
so Franklin does not say. Those readers who have detected a nihilistic streak
in Melville's work will find Franldin dismissing out of hand all such considerations. Chapter Three is on black culture-slave songs, work songs,
prison songs (on which Franklin has nothing new to say, with whatever valid
insights there aJTe coming from the scholarship of Bruce Jackson)-while the
fourth chapter discusses some white prison authors in addition to black authors.
Chapter Five matches white Malcolm Braly with black Chester Himes, and
the last chapter discusses recent prison literature, mostly black. This absurd
balancing act unsuccessfully conceals a politi Gal assumption which infonns the
book but which is never stated as such: the black nation, as he calls it, is the
vanguard of the proletariat which will lead us in a socialist revolution. One
absurdity leads to another.
Franklin advances our knowledge of prison literature not one iota, although
the bibliography is extensive. The gravest weakness of the book is its peculiar
kind of nationalism because prisons, especially today, are an international question. From Attica to the Gulag, from Chile to Cambodia, the issues of
imprisonment, torture, crime and punishment, -and social control are urgent and
demand serious attention. Ideas dragged out of Depression Marxism will
hardly do. Franklin discusses a large body of American literature in a way
that is neither Hluminalting nor useful; that literature remains to be analyzed
intelligently.
MICHAEL ScRIVENER

Tiiayne State University

Dcfamiliarization in Language and Literature by R. H. Stacy. Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press, 1977. Pp. xi + 193. $14.00.
This study borrows the concept of I' defamiliarization" from Victor
Shldovsky's "Art as Technique" (1917) and argues that his Russian Formalism
offers a valid approach to literature today. For Shldovsky, the work of
literature was an autonomous language system set in opposition to the "practical" discourses that depend on habitual perception: "The technique of art is
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to make objects 'unfamiliar,' to make fonns difficult, to increase the length

and difficulty of perception because perception is an aesthetic end in itself and
must be prolonged. Art;s a way of experie'llci'llg the artful'll8$$ of 4'Il object;
the object ittelf is '!lOt import4'llt." Although his term presupposed the familiar
and consequently presented artfulness as a modification of historically fluctuating
cultural norms, Shklovsky reduced the various motives, messages, and effects
of literature to " defamiliarization," a single universal drive for technical
innovation and perceptual renewal. Stacy uncritically accepts this definition
of ott as technique and of perception as an end in itself, denying as a
consequence the importance of content and context.
Shldovsky formulated his radically synchtonic description of literature as
a corrective to the literary criticism of his liay that intepteted art in the
light of simple notions of history and the history of ideas. He thus made
technique the subject of serious critical attention. Failing to acquaint an
American readership with this legitim.re contribution by Russian . Formalism
in the development of European literary theory, Stacy presents defamiliarization
as an undiscovered and total aesthetic. He suggests that in fact the poetics
of snch recent critics as Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva are restatements of
Shldovsky. To the contrary, Fredric Jameson has shown in The Priwn-House
of Ltmguage that Formalist isolation of the work of literature prompted
subsequent poetic theory to reconsider the work of art in its communication
situation and thus establish new relationships between art and cultural history.
Coming in the wake of such corrective responses as structuralism and semiotics,
Stacy's formalism is simply anachtonistic. In the ""pious sequence of examples that makes up the body of his book, furthermore, Stacy extends
" defamiliarization" to include changes in practical as well as poetic language

so broadly that the term, for lack of the precision it gained from Shldovsky's
own applications, becomes too general to be meaningful.
NANCY ARMSIRONG

WaY'lle State Umver,",

